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This paper develops an open economy portfolio balance model with en-
dogenous asset supply. Domestic producers finance capital goods through
credit and bonds in accordance with debt capital costs as well as through
equity assets. Private households hold a portfolio of domestic and for-
eign assets, shift balances depending on risk-return considerations, and
maximise real consumption in accordance with the real exchange rate.
Within this general equilibrium model, it can be shown that expansive
monetary interventions, being applied throughout the course of economic
crises, stabilise the real amount of domestic investments at the cost of
inflation, currency devaluation, distortions of interest rates, and risk
clusters on the central bank’s balance sheet. Furthermore, through ex-
change rate stabilising interventions, the central bank is able to stabilise
the real amount of domestic investments and in turn the main goal of ex-
change rate stabilisation is also achieved. However, either risk clusters
on central bank’s balance sheet or changes in the domestic price level
emerge. This consequently results in both types of central bank inter-
ventions promoting an inefficient international allocation of real capital
investments.
JEL: E10, E44, E52
Keywords: portfolio balance, monetary policy, macroeconomic risk,
exchange rate, real capital investments
Portfolio balance models have a long history in economic research and are widely used
to explain the characteristics of exchange rates. The first significant models were devel-
oped, for example, by Grubel (1968), Dornbusch (1975), Girton and Henderson (1976),
Branson (1977), Lucas (1982), Allen and Kenen (1983), and Branson and Henderson
(1985). Within these models, private households choose an optimal portfolio based on
risk-return considerations. This portfolio contains domestic and foreign assets, which are
seen as imperfect substitutes.
In the context of monetary policy, portfolio balance models are able to explain, through
risk differences, why interest rate differentials may persist vis-a`-vis the base country in the
case of pegged floats and fixed exchange rate regimes (Frankel et al., 2004; Shambaugh,
2004; Obstfeld et al., 2005). However, Obstfeld (2004) remarks that further research is
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required as to date there is “no integrative general-equilibrium monetary model of inter-
national portfolio choice, although we need one”. Recent research analyses the impact of
different types of macroeconomic shocks on asset prices, the exchange rate, and capital
flows (Hau and Rey, 2006; Devereux and Sutherland, 2007; Gourinchas and Rey, 2007;
Pavlova and Rigobon, 2007; Tille, 2008; Tille and van Wincoop, 2010) and places partic-
ular emphasis on trying to explain the home bias in asset holdings (Heathcote and Perri,
2009, and references cited therein).
This paper considers the origination of financial assets and the implications this has
for monetary policy transmission. To date, the amount of bonds and equity assets have
not been treated as endogenous in the portfolio balance literature, with the exception of
Devereux and Saito (2006), who assume that the supply of bonds depends negatively on
the bond interest rate. Despite this, neither the possibility to substitute bonds for loans,
nor the special characteristics of equity assets are considered. The model developed here
fills this gap. Looking at the economic literature, it is argued that producers choose an
optimal capital structure according to the static trade-off theory (Modigliani and Miller,
1963; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), preferring the type of debt financing which requires
the lowest capital costs (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). Furthermore, equity assets con-
tain call options on producers’ real capital goods (Merton, 1974). These relationships are
integrated into a portfolio balance model of an open economy by strictly considering the
balance sheet restrictions economic actors are facing in stock and flow figures, a require-
ment stressed by Brainard and Tobin (1968). Sims (1980) also sees this as necessary in
order to avert a “bad system of restrictions”. Through this approach, it is revealed that
portfolio adjustments have an impact on the amount of real domestic investments, which
subsequently affect real domestic production. Since the central bank is able to influence
the portfolio composition of private households through monetary interventions, it has
an indirect impact on the real economy. This impact needs to be considered if monetary
policy trade-offs are to be comprehensively analysed in the context of portfolio balance
models. Therefore, it is advisable to endogenise the domestic asset supply, as is done in
this paper.
The results of the model indicate that the real amount of domestic investments ad-
justs in reaction to external shocks in exogenous variables. This is evident in investors’
behaviour, seeing as changes in the foreign interest rate, the relative macroeconomic
risk, and the foreign price level affect the relative attractiveness of domestic investments
compared to foreign investments.
A relative increase in the domestic macroeconomic risk level, seemingly prevalent in
times of economic crises, would be followed by real domestic disinvestments in the long
term. However, if the central bank reacts with open market purchases of domestic bonds,
or with an increase in the supply of credit, it takes over domestic risk on its balance
sheet. Through expansive monetary interventions, it reduces the domestic risk premium
and consequently averts real domestic disinvestments. There are some related side effects
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however, such as domestic inflation, currency devaluation, distortions in domestic interest
rates, and risk clusters on the central bank’s balance sheet.
Furthermore, the central bank is able to stabilise the exchange rate in reaction to ex-
ternal shocks through interventions on credit, domestic bond and foreign asset markets.
However, it is essential to choose the right intervention strategy due to the different rea-
sons for exchange rate changes. Sterilised interventions are required and only sustainably
effective if changes in the foreign interest rate, or in the relative macroeconomic risk, are
the reasons for exchange rate changes. Non-sterilised interventions only work in the case
of changes in the foreign price level. Nevertheless, both types of interventions stabilise
the real amount of domestic investments, as well as the exchange rate. However, ster-
ilised interventions promote risk clusters on the central bank’s balance sheet, whereas
non-sterilised interventions are connected with changes in the domestic price level.
Both expansive monetary interventions, being applied during economic crises, and
exchange rate stabilising interventions thus avert appropriate adjustments in the real
amount of domestic investments, which comes at the cost of foreign investments. These
interventions by central banks consequently cause an inefficient international allocation
of real capital goods.
The paper is structured as follows; the first section deals with the general model frame-
work, followed by a detailed definition of the model assumptions. Thereupon, the model
is solved and the different transmission channels of exogenous shocks are presented. The
extent to which expansive monetary interventions are able to neutralise the impact of
an increase in the domestic macroeconomic risk is subsequently analysed. Following on
from here, the possibilities the central bank has to avert changes in the exchange rate
are presented, also illustrating how interventions affect interest rates, as well as the real
economy. Vector autoregressive estimations for three different countries in periods when
pegged exchange rates existed are then performed.1 The empirical results highlight that
the theoretical implications of exchange rate stabilising interventions also occur in prac-
tice. Reasons as to why simplifications do not reduce the general validity of the model
are subsequently discussed and the results are then summarised in the conclusion to the
paper.
I. Model Structure
A. General Framework
The considered open economy has three different actors, those being the central bank,
private households and producers. Each actor faces a balance sheet restriction, which
shows its stock figures in the form of assets and liabilities, and an income balance restric-
tion, which incorporates its specific inflows and outflows. Domestic actors are not able
to influence variables of the foreign country, while foreign actors neither hold domestic
1Austria (1989M06 - 1998M12), Belgium (1989M10 - 1998M12), and Denmark (1999M02 - 2011M3).
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assets nor consume domestic goods. The model considers one single and homogenous
good, which is produced at home as well as abroad. This good may either be consumed
by private households or used as a factor of production. Capital is considered as the only
factor of production.
The prices of goods and financial assets are flexible. Domestic bonds and foreign
assets are fixed interest bearing assets, whereas domestic equity assets pay out varying
dividends. While the domestic asset amounts are considered constant in the short term,
in the long term the amount of domestic bonds and equity assets may vary. This is due to
producers’ maximising firm value and private households’ maximising real consumption
given their budget constraints. The aggregate portfolio of private households consists of
several gross substitutes, these being domestic money, domestic bonds, domestic equity,
and foreign assets, and has an optimal composition with respect to private households’
risk-return objectives.
Through these assumptions, we obtain a set of general equilibrium conditions for the
short term and the long term respectively. In the following sections, the assumptions are
specified in detail.2
B. Actors and Balance Restrictions
Central Bank
The central bank is the actor capable of conducting monetary policy operations. De-
pending on the preferred exchange rate regime, its main policy target may be either
exchange rate stability, or the stability of other variables like the domestic price level,
real domestic production, or domestic interest rates. It is assumed that the central bank
completely controls three variables which it uses independently to fulfil its mandate.
First, it may change the volume of credit it supplies to producers (K̂).3 Second, it is able
to buy or sell domestic bonds (n̂BCB), and third, it can also trade foreign bonds it holds
as currency reserves (n̂FCB) in return for domestic money (M).
In total, the central bank holds assets in domestic currency to the value of the credit
amount (K̂), the central bank’s domestic bonds (BCB), and foreign assets (sFCB). Given
that pB denotes the price of one domestic bond, s the exchange rate in direct quotation,
and pF the price of one foreign asset in foreign currency, it holds that:
BCB = n̂BCB ⋅ pB(1)
sFCB = n̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ pF(2)
2An overview of all exogenous (roof-headed) and constant (line-headed) variables can be found in
table A.1, and of all endogenous variables in table A.2 of the appendix.
3Naturally, commercial banks supply credit to the producers within an economy. However, the central
bank has a key impact on the amount of lending since it supplies credit to these commercial banks. Since
the commercial banks are not considered in the model for the sake of simplicity, it is reasonable to assume
that the central bank determines the credit supply. Thereby, it is implied that the central bank can be
interpreted as the economy’s aggregated banking sector within the model.
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In terms of liabilities, the central bank holds money (M) and net assets (NetA). Con-
sequently, the balance sheet restriction of the central bank is:
(3) K̂ +BCB + sFCB =M +NetA
While the amount of money changes with the amount of credit or the amount of
domestic bonds and foreign assets, the net assets change if profits or losses occur due to
a change in the valuation of domestic bonds or foreign assets:
dM = dK̂ + dn̂BCB ⋅ pB + dn̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ pF(4)
dNetA = dpB ⋅ n̂BCB + dpF ⋅ s ⋅ n̂FCB + ds ⋅ pF ⋅ n̂FCB(5)
The equations 4 and 5 comprise the fundamental relations of the balance approach.
Each increase in the amount of assets needs to be financed by an increase in the amount
of liabilities4, whereas an increase in the valuation of assets only positively affects the
value of liabilities5, without any impact on their amount, and vice versa.
Consequently, the total supply of domestic money (Ms) is completely controlled by
the central bank. It is determined by the initial amount of money (M) plus the changes
in the money amount (see equation 4) caused by monetary policy interventions:
(6) Ms =M + dK̂ + dn̂BCB ⋅ pB + dn̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ pF
Since the assets of the central bank bear interest, the central bank receives interest
income (iK ⋅ K̂ + iB ⋅ BCB + îF ⋅ sFCB). For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that
the central bank distributes its interest income immediately to the private households.6
Thus, the central bank’s balance of income is always balanced.
Private Households
It is assumed that private households hold their aggregated wealth (W ) in the form
of the domestic money amount (M), domestic bonds (BP ), domestic equity (E)
7, and
foreign assets (sFP ). The value of each holding in domestic currency (BP , E, sFP ) is the
amount of private households’ assets (nBP , n
E , nFP ) multiplied by the relevant asset price
4The central bank is only able to adjust its amount of liabilities by changing the domestic money
amount M .
5Since money is the numeraire, the value of money does not vary in absolute terms. Consequently,
if the value of assets (measured in domestic currency) changes, the residual position of net assets NetA
adjusts to this in the case of the central bank.
6This assumption does not reduce the general validity of the model seeing as in practice, the income
of central banks is normally distributed to the respective governments, who then transfer it to private
households, e. g., through salary payments or social benefits.
7Private households hold the total amount of domestic equity assets since the central bank does not
hold domestic equity assets and foreign investors do not hold domestic assets at all. Therefore, E = EP
and respectively nE = nEP .
5
in domestic currency (pB , pE , s ⋅ pF ):
BP = nBP ⋅ pB(7)
E = nE ⋅ pE(8)
sFP = nFP ⋅ s ⋅ pF(9)
Hence, the balance sheet restriction of private households is expressed by:
(10) M +BP +E + sFP =W
Consequently, it follows that private households’ wealth either changes with a varying
amount or valuation of domestic or foreign assets.
The nominal income of the private households is the sum of interest payments and
central bank distribution:
IncP = iB ⋅BP + iE ⋅E + îF ⋅ sFP + iK ⋅ K̂ + iB ⋅BCB + îF ⋅ sFCB(11)
Below, it is assumed that the private households use all their income for the consump-
tion of either domestic goods (CD) or foreign goods (CF ):
(12) IncP = CD +CF
Thereby, it is implied that private households do not have any incentive to shift con-
sumption inter-temporarily through saving or dissaving. Furthermore, private house-
holds’ balance of income is always balanced.
Producers
Each producer in the economy produces a homogeneous good in a competitive environ-
ment. The homogenous good can either be consumed by private households or be used
as a factor of production by the producers.8 Capital, in terms of real capital goods, is
considered as the only factor of production and each producer finances its capital goods
through credit, bonds or equity assets. Consequently, the producers’ balance restric-
tion expresses that the aggregated value of domestic capital goods (CG) is equal to the
aggregated value of domestic credit (K̂), domestic bonds (B) and domestic equity (E):
(13) CG = K̂ +B +E
8If the good is used in the production process, it becomes worn out and therefore depreciates over
time.
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The implicit value of one capital good (valCG) is the total value divided by the real
amount (nCG):
(14) valCG = CG
nCG
Naturally, the real amount of domestic capital goods is connected to producers’ amount
of liabilities (determined by K̂, nB , and nE). With respect to the short term, it is assumed
that producers’ amount of liabilities is constant. The rationale here is substantiated in
section D. If producers take on additional credit or issue additional assets over the long
term, they acquire the financial means to increase real investments, and vice versa. The
consequence is that in the long term, producers’ real amount of domestic capital goods
(nCG) changes by the value of the change in the amount of liabilities (dK̂ + dnB ⋅ pB +
dnE ⋅ pE) divided by the price level of domestic goods (p):
(15) dnCG = dK̂ + dnB ⋅ pB + dnE ⋅ pE
p
The producers generate income9 to the amount of nominal domestic production (Y ),
which consists of the domestic price level (p) multiplied by real domestic production (Y r):
(16) Y = Y r ⋅ p
Real domestic production depends on the amount of real capital goods held by the
producers. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale
and constant total factor productivity (a), a linear relation between Y r and nCG results
in the current case, with real capital being the only factor of production10
(17) Y r = a ⋅ nCG
Moreover, since capital is the only factor of production, producers’ income in its entirety
is used to remunerate the lenders of capital:
(18) Y = iK ⋅ K̂ + iB ⋅B + iE ⋅E
Consequently, producers’ balance of income is always balanced.
9In the case of producers, the term ‘income’ is used in the sense of value added. In line with the
model, this is equal to producers’ revenue less the depreciations on capital investment.
10The amount of producers’ liabilities does not change in the short term. Thus, it follows from equation
15 that in the short term dnCG = 0, and consequently dY r = 0 as well. However, if an exogenous shock
affects the economy, nCG may change during the transition process towards a new long term equilibrium
since producers’ amount of liabilities may adjust. Consequently, Y r may change in the long term as well.
The rationale for these relationships is substantiated in section D.
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Consolidated Balances
Given the balance equations of the open economy’s three actors (3, 10, and 13), as well
as the following relations,
B = BP +BCB nB = nBP + n̂BCB B = pB ⋅ nB(19)
F = FP + FCB nF = nFP + n̂FCB F = pF ⋅ nF(20)
we find that through consolidation, the value of domestic capital goods (CG) and the
value of foreign assets held by domestic actors in domestic currency (sF ) are equal to the
aggregated domestic wealth (W +NetA):
(21) CG + sF =W +NetA
Since all balances of income are balanced11, the aggregated balance of income is bal-
anced as well.
C. Prices of Domestic Bonds, Foreign Assets, and Domestic Goods
As is the case in traditional finance, the price of a financial asset is determined by
the present value of its future cash flow. Concerning domestic bonds, it is assumed that
the time to maturity of an average domestic bond is indefinite. Therefore, the cash flow
of one fixed interest bearing domestic bond is characterised by a constant perpetuity of
coupon payments (qBt+n = qB for n = 0,1, ...,∞). By implying that interest rates are
positive and that the term structure of interest rates is flat, the price of one domestic
bond in domestic currency (pB) is:
(22) pB = qB
iB
The price of one foreign asset in foreign currency (pF ) results analogically:
(23) pF = qF
îF
Whereas the price level of foreign goods (p̂∗) is exogenously given, it is assumed that
the price level of domestic goods (p) is determined through the relations of the Quantity
Theory. The Quantity Equation expresses that the domestic money amount (M) is used
with a constant velocity (v) in order to conduct a desired amount of real domestic good
11The income of the central bank is distributed to private households. Private households’ income
is equal to their consumption expenditures (see equation 12). Producers distribute nominal domestic
production to the lenders of capital, i. e. central bank and private households (see equation 18).
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transactions (approximated by Y r), which are connected to the domestic price level (p):
(24) M ⋅ v = p ⋅ Y r
Consequently, the domestic price level is determined by:
(25) p = M ⋅ v
Y r
D. Domestic Asset Supply
The Optimal Capital Structure
Producers finance themselves through capital forms debt (K̂ + B) and equity (E).
According to the static trade-off theory, an optimal debt to equity ratio exists when
producer value (K̂ + B + E) is maximised. It focuses on the benefits and costs of debt
financing.
First, Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that the capital structure is irrelevant for
firms’ total value. However, this is not the case if the general framework is extended
through taxes, agency costs, and costs of financial distress. Primarily, the use of debt
is favoured if interest payments can be deducted from corporate tax (Modigliani and
Miller, 1963). In addition, debt financing reduces the agency conflict between firms’
managers and shareholders. Managers have the incentive to misuse a firm’s free cash flow
on supplementary grants and unprofitable investments at the expense of equity holders.
Debt financing reduces the free cash flow available to managers, thereby limiting this
agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). However, issuing debt causes
agency costs due to conflicts between shareholders and debtors (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Furthermore, there are other costs associated with issuing debt, i. e. the costs
of financial distress (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Myers, 1977). These costs will arise if
a firm uses excessive debt, putting it in danger of failing to meet interest and principal
payments. Even before bankruptcy, costs occur because a firm in distress will lose valuable
customers, creditors, employees and suppliers to more secure competitors.
Even though taxes, agency costs and the risk of bankruptcy are not explicitly modeled,
they can be seen as the reason why a target capital structure exists, which the producers
tend to achieve. By implying that taxes and agency costs do not change, the costs of
financial distress are higher the lower producers’ income (Y ) is, and the higher producers’
interest payments on debt capital (iK ⋅ K̂ + qB ⋅nB) are. The optimal capital structure is
therefore achieved when the marginal benefits of debt financing are equal to the marginal
costs of financial distress. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that this is the case
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if the debt capital costs reach a certain portion (dc) of producers’ income (Y ):
iK ⋅ K̂ + qB ⋅ nB = dc ⋅ Y(26)
0 < dc < 1
If iK ⋅ K̂ + qB ⋅ nB > dc ⋅ Y , the marginal benefits of debt financing are lower than the
marginal costs, and producers tend to reduce leverage over time. The reverse relationship
also holds.
Domestic Bond Supply and Credit Demand
The macroeconomic literature offers both the credit view and the money view to charac-
terise producers’ choice of debt capital (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bolton and Freixas,
2006). In a nutshell, the credit view implies that firms cannot easily substitute bank
loans for bonds. Economic reasons for this are, for example, that assessments of credit-
worthiness or the issuance of bonds are time consuming, as well as credit agreements and
bond issues having a time constraint. Hence, the money view considers bank loans and
bonds to be perfect substitutes since both are similar forms of debt capital.
Below, it is assumed that producers’ choice of debt capital follows the credit view in
the short term so that bond supply and credit demand are constant. Consequently, pro-
ducers’ short term supply of domestic bonds vis-a`-vis the private households is implicitly
expressed by equation 19. It is the total amount of domestic bonds (nB) less the holdings
of the central bank (n̂BCB):
(27) (nBP )s = nB − n̂BCB
Regarding the credit market, the central bank consequently faces a constant demand for
credit in the short term, thus being able to cause infinite changes in the credit interest
rate through infinitesimal changes in the credit supply. As a consequence, the credit
interest rate (iK) can be arbitrarily set, and can therefore be considered as exogenously
determined by the central bank’s monetary policy interventions in the short term. As a
result, producers’ target capital structure is not necessarily matched in the short term,
since deviations from equation 26 are possible due to the resulting implications of the
credit view.12
Hence, over time credit demand and bond supply become more and more elastic, as
indicated by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap et al. (1993). In the long term,
it is therefore reasonable to assume that the money view holds, eventually allowing the
producers to adjust their capital structure until it reaches its optimum following the
12Since K̂ and nB are constant in the short term, the producers are not able to avert an increase in
the debt capital costs (iK ⋅ K̂ + qB ⋅ nB) if the central bank increases iK , and vice versa. Thus, it is not
possible that equation 26 holds in any short term situation.
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rationale of the static trade-off theory.13 Thereby, it is implied that over the long term
producers will invest efficiently in order to obtain the highest possible output (see equation
17), given the financial constraint expressed in equation 26. In other words, producers
maximise the amount of real capital goods (nCG) they are able to finance through debt
capital ( K̂+B
p
) in accordance with equation 26. It follows that producers’ demand for
credit (Kd) and supply of domestic bonds ((nB)s) depend negatively on the credit interest
rate (iK). The reason for this is that an increase in the credit interest rate increases
debt capital costs, with producers tending to reduce the total amount of debt liabilities
to again reach their optimal debt capital budget (dc ⋅ Y ).14 In addition, the demand
for credit depends positively, and the supply of bonds negatively, on the interest rate
difference between the bond interest rate and the credit interest rate (iB − iK). This is
due to the resulting arbitrage behaviour which occurs when choosing the desired amount
of debt capital. If the interest rate on credit is higher than that on bonds, producers issue
additional bonds and try to substitute the relatively expensive credit to maximise K̂+B
p
,
and vice versa. Consequently, during the transition process towards an optimal amount
of debt capital, the following equations hold:
Kd =K(iK , iB − iK)(28)
∂Kd
∂iK
< 0, ∂Kd
∂(iB−iK) > 0
(nB)s = nB(iK , iB − iK)(29)
∂nB
∂iK
< 0, ∂nB
∂(iB−iK) < 0
Due to the money view, credit demand and bond supply adjust until bond and credit
interest rates are equal in the long term. Thus, the long-term optimum is characterised
by budget constraint 26, equilibrium on the credit market (see equation 30), and bond
and credit interest rate being equal (see equation 31).
Kd = K̂(30)
iK = iB(31)
13Maximising the firm value through an optimal capital structure, which will be obtained if equation
26 is satisfied.
14This effect is comparable to the income effect with regard to the consumption of two goods. If the
price of one good increases (here: increase in iK), the demand for both goods (here: credit demand and
bond supply) decreases.
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Solving the equations 26, 30, and 31 for nB , under consideration of equations 16 and
24, it implicitly follows for producers’ long term total supply of domestic bonds that:
(32) (nB)s = dc ⋅M ⋅ v − iB ⋅ K̂
qB
Consequently, producers’ long term supply of domestic bonds vis-a`-vis the private
households is the total supply, less the holdings of the central bank:
(33) (nBP )s = dc ⋅M ⋅ v − iB ⋅ K̂
qB
− n̂BCB
Domestic Equity Assets
The price of one domestic equity asset (pE) is the net present value of its dividend cash
flow. By assumption, dividend payments are positive and private households regard the
dividend cash flow as a constant perpetuity (divt+n = div for n = 0,1, ...,∞). Furthermore,
the equity discount rate is positive and its term structure is flat. Accordingly, the price
of one domestic equity asset (pE) is:
(34) pE = div
iE
Hence, the dividend payment per equity asset (div) is the aggregated amount of do-
mestic dividend payments (Div ∶= iE ⋅ E) divided by the total amount of equity assets
(nE):
(35) div = Div
nE
Taking the producers’ income (equation 18), the aggregated domestic dividend pay-
ments (Div) have to be equal to producers’ residual income.15 By transposing equation
18 under consideration of equation 16, it follows in general that:
(36) Div = p ⋅ Y r − iK ⋅ K̂ − iB ⋅B
Following this, it will firstly be discussed which variables Div is determined by in the
short term. Taking the equations 19, 22, and Quantity Equation 24, it follows that Div
is completely determined by variables which are constant (v, K̂, qB , nB) or exogenously
determined by the domestic central bank (M , iK):
(37) Div =M ⋅ v − iK ⋅ K̂ − qB ⋅ nB
15For determining dividend payments, an equivalent approach is applied by Tille (2008).
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Secondly, this also turns out to be the case in the long term, seeing as through con-
sideration of the producers’ target capital structure constraint in equation 26, we obtain
the following:
(38) Div =M ⋅ v ⋅ (1 − dc)
If domestic equity assets are compared with domestic bonds and foreign assets, what
they have in common is that their values only depend on their cash flows, not on the
amount of real capital goods held by domestic or foreign producers (see equations 22, 23,
and 34). However, they are also different in several crucial ways. The cash flow stream of
domestic bonds is given by qB and is independent of other variables. If domestic producers
are able to issue additional domestic bonds (increase in nB) without affecting the interest
rate (iB)16, the aggregated value of domestic bonds (B) increases (see equations 19 and
22). This is not the case for domestic equity assets. Producers cannot change the total
equity value through an issue or buyback of equity assets since the aggregated amount of
dividend payments (Div) is independent of the amount of domestic equity assets in the
short term, as well as in the long term (see equations 37 and 38). If producers increase the
amount of equity assets, the amount of nominal dividend payments on each equity asset
decreases proportionally and thus, the price of each equity asset decreases proportionally
given an unchanged discount rate (iE). In sum, the aggregated value of domestic equity
(E) remains unchanged.17
The structure of ownership rights is another difference between domestic bonds and
equity assets. Merton (1974) maintains that each equity asset is considered to contain
a call option on producers’ assets, i. e. producers’ real capital goods. By exercising
this option, they receive real goods to the value of the current equity price (see equation
15). In the following analysis, the opposite relationship is also assumed, i. e. real goods
contain call options on equity assets. Thus, private households have the ability to redeem
a proportion of their equity assets in return for real goods on the one hand, or exchange
a part of their real income for equity assets on the other. While this assumption seems
unfamiliar at first, it becomes clear when bringing to mind how different mechanisms can
be used to redeem or generate equity assets in practice, given a fixed amount of liabilities.
The first possibility is a change in the stocks of produced goods. If stocks are reduced,
equity capital is released, whereas if stocks are increased, additional equity capital is
bounded given an unchanged amount of liabilities. The second possibility is the depre-
ciation channel. If depreciations on real capital are not entirely replaced, equity capital
is released and the cash flow from investing increases. If producers’ cash flow is used
for additional investment on the other hand, additional equity is bounded. The third
possibility is a direct exchange of equity with the producers. Although owners of small
16An increase in nB is considered given the ceteris paribus assumption. Consequently, it is implied
that the demand for domestic bonds is completely elastic; this is generally not the case, but is assumed
for this gedankenexperiment.
17The same conclusion can be drawn by analysing the approach by Tille (2008).
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private companies are able to personally draw or contribute equity capital relatively eas-
ily, the more coordination that is required, the more is the likelihood that partners will
be present. For instance, shareholders of corporations have to decide at general meetings
whether stocks should be repurchased or issued.
Since all three procedures are time consuming, it is reasonable to assume that private
households are only gradually able to redeem or contribute equity over the long term.
Therefore, the amount of equity assets is considered constant in the short term and may
change over time.
It also needs to be discussed what incentives private households have to exchange
equity assets for real goods, and vice versa. Generally, it is reasonable to assume that
private households consume in an efficient way insofar that they maximise the real amount
of consumption (CD
p
+ CF
p̂∗⋅s ) given their budget constraint. At any time, their budget
constraint is expressed by their income balance restriction (equation 12). Taking the
equations 11, 18, 19 and 20 into account, it follows that private households’ budget
constraint can be expressed by:
(39) Y + s ⋅ qF ⋅ nF = CD +CF
To maximise real consumption, private households compare the price level of domestic
goods with the price level of foreign goods in domestic currency. If the price levels are
different, private households accordingly shift their consumption to the relatively cheaper
good. Consequently, the composition of consumption depends on the real exchange rate
(sreal), which is the quotient of the domestic price level (p) and the foreign price level in
domestic currency (p̂∗ ⋅ s):
(40) sreal = p
p̂∗ ⋅ s
Here, it is initially discussed how private households consume if purchasing power parity
holds (sreal = 1) – given long term equilibriums in all other markets. If sreal = 1, private
households are indifferent regarding the consumption of either domestic or foreign goods.
If in such a situation private households were to consume more domestic goods than
are domestically produced (CD > Y ) they would respectively consume less foreign goods
than foreign interest payments (CF < s ⋅ qF ⋅ nF ) according to income balance restriction
39. The domestic economy would experience a current account surplus18, which would
be connected with an excess supply of foreign currency, leading to an appreciation of
the domestic currency (decrease in s). Thus, domestic goods would become relatively
expensive (sreal would increase) and private households would adjust the composition
of their consumption until purchasing power parity were again to hold in conjunction
with an equilibrium on the foreign exchange market (balanced current account). Conse-
18The current account consists of the trade account plus the account of international interest payments.
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quently, long term equilibrium is inevitably connected with purchasing power parity and
a balanced current account, insofar that private households consume domestic goods to
the value of domestic production (Y ), and foreign goods to the value of foreign interest
payments (s ⋅ qF ⋅ nF ).
If sreal < 1 in a situation without long term equilibrium, domestic goods are relatively
cheaper and private households tend to substitute foreign goods for domestic goods in
order to maximise real consumption. However, if they do so, the result is that they
require more domestic goods than are domestically produced (in accordance with income
balance restriction 39). This can be overcome in two ways; on the one hand, domestic
goods can be released in the long term if domestic producers reduce their amount of debt
liabilities (see equation 15). On the other hand, private households have the possibility
to allow for additional domestic consumption themselves, since in the long term they are
able to redeem equity assets in return for domestic real goods from the producers. On
the other side of the coin, if domestic goods are relatively expensive compared to foreign
goods (sreal > 1), domestic private households tend to consume less domestic goods than
are domestically produced, exchanging the surplus in return for equity assets. During
the transition process towards a long term equilibrium with purchasing power parity and
a balanced current account, the following relationship holds accordingly:
CD = Y − dK̂ − dnB ⋅ pB − dnE ⋅ pE(41)
dnE
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
> 0 if sreal > 1< 0 if sreal < 1= 0 else
E. Balance of Payments and Foreign Asset Supply
Balance of Payments
Through the consumption behaviour of private households, it follows that in long term
equilibrium, the current account is balanced. Since in long term equilibrium the domestic
amount of foreign assets does not change, the capital account is balanced as well, with
the result being a balanced balance of payments:
(42) 0 = CD − Y = −CF + s ⋅ qF ⋅ nF
Equation 42 also holds under the occurrence of an exogenous shock. This is because the
total amount of credit, domestic bonds and equity is constant in the short term, given
the economic reasons in section D.
Hence, during the transition process towards long term equilibrium, the current account
may be positive or negative. Since the balance of payments is constantly balanced (Meade,
1951), it is a necessary condition that a positive current account is accompanied by a
negative capital account corresponding to the same amount. A positive current account
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arises if domestic goods are relatively cheaper compared to foreign goods (sreal < 1), in
accordance with private households’ consumption behaviour (see equation 41). In such
a case, private households tend to consume more domestic goods than are domestically
produced. Consequently, following private households’ budget constraint 39, less than
the total amount of foreign interest income is utilised for the consumption of foreign
goods. The residual foreign interest income is then used to acquire foreign assets, causing
a capital account deficit equal to the current account surplus. The opposite holds, if
sreal > 1. During the transition process towards long term equilibrium, the balance of
payments restriction is consequently expressed by:
(43) 0 = CD − Y + dK̂ + dnB ⋅ pB + dnE ⋅ pE = −CF + s ⋅ qF ⋅ nF − dnF ⋅ s ⋅ pF
While the value of the current account during the transition process is explained by
private households’ consumption behaviour, the value of the capital account has yet to
be explained. What are the incentives for private households to use positive or negative
residual foreign interest income to acquire or sell foreign assets?
A current account surplus brings about an excess supply of foreign currency, which sub-
sequently causes an appreciation of the domestic currency (decrease in s). Consequently,
the amount of foreign assets held in private households’ portfolio loses value in domestic
currency. Hence, the foreign asset portion of the portfolio would become too small to
maintain an optimal portfolio composition. Thus, private households compensate for this
loss in value caused by the exchange rate by increasing the amount of foreign assets they
hold. The opposite occurs if a current account deficit exists.
These relationships result through private households’ portfolio selection. They will
be described in detail upon specification of the supply of foreign assets in the coming
section.
Foreign Asset Supply
Overall, the supply of foreign assets vis-a`-vis the private households consists of three
parts. First, there is the initial amount of foreign assets held domestically (nF ). The
second part is the holdings of the domestic central bank (n̂FCB), and the third, the changes
in the amount of foreign assets due to fluctuations in the balance of payments (dnF ). From
private households’ budget constraint 39 and the balance of payments restriction 43, it
follows for dnF that:
(44) dnF = −dK̂ + dnB ⋅ pB + dnE ⋅ pE
s ⋅ pF
As discussed before, the amounts of domestic assets are constant in the short term,
and therefore dnF = 0 according to equation 44. Consequently, the short term supply of
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foreign bonds vis-a`-vis the private households is:
(45) (nFP )s = nF − n̂FCB
Since the domestic asset amounts may adjust over time, dnF may be positive or negative
in the long term. Consequently, the long term supply of foreign bonds vis-a`-vis the private
households is:
(46) (nFP )s = nF − n̂FCB + dnF
F. Portfolio Selection and Money Demand
By assumption, private households are risk averse and maintain their individual asset
portfolios following the optimal portfolio rule of Markowitz (1952). With respect to
its personal preferences, each household chooses a portfolio which delivers its preferred
risk-return relationship. It is assumed that private households’ preferences are constant
over time, not changing with the level of wealth. In addition, transaction costs are not
considered. The sum of individual asset holdings corresponds to private households’
aggregated portfolio (M + BP + E + sFP ), which represents private households’ wealth
(W ) according to the balance equation 10. The assets within private households’ portfolio
are gross substitutes and the portfolio proportions corresponding to each asset class (m,
b, e, f) are:
m =M
W
b = BP
W
e = E
W
f = sFP
W
(47)
m + b + e + f = 1
Given the assets’ risk structure19, private households tend to hold a higher proportion
invested in an asset the higher its expected return and the lower its opportunity costs
(the expected return on alternative assets). For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed
that private households form static expectations about future asset prices and the future
exchange rate under uncertainty. Accordingly, their expectations do not differ on average
from current market values. This implies that at no point of time are changes in asset
prices, or in the exchange rate expected (on average) by private households. Consequently,
the expected return on each asset is equal to the corresponding current market level of
interest rates (iB , iE , îF ).
Given the structure of returns, private households tend to increase the fraction they
hold of a specific asset the less it contributes to the total risk of the portfolio, and vice
versa. Besides the individual risk of each asset class, which is at least partly diversifiable in
the portfolio selection process, it is assumed that domestic and foreign assets are exposed
19The variance-covariance matrix of asset returns.
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to systemic risk, which is related to serious disturbances in the corresponding financial
systems. Since systemic risk is considered to affect the entirety of assets in a particular
economy, it is termed macroeconomic risk in this paper. This macroeconomic risk may
be driven by financial instability, e. g., caused by regulation procedures allowing for a
lack of transparency and information asymmetries, by political instability, e. g., caused
by national unrest, or even by the risk of natural disasters, e. g., caused by changes
in the environment. Since these are factors which lie beyond the range of the model,
it is reasonable to assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the extent of macroeconomic
risk is exogenously given. Here, we define σ̂ as the difference between domestic and
foreign macroeconomic risk. Consequently, an exogenous increase in σ̂ indicates a relative
increase in domestic macroeconomic risk, whereby all domestic assets become relatively
riskier compared to foreign assets, and vice versa.20
Domestic money is notably different compared to other assets since it is not only part
of the portfolio selection process, but is also used for transaction purposes. Consequently,
private households’ demand for money needs to be consistent with the relations of Quan-
tity Equation 24. Accordingly, private households will demand more money the higher
the price of one goods transaction (p) is, the more transactions they tend to perform
(approximated by Y r), and the less transactions are technically possible to proceed in a
certain period of time (v). Altogether, private households tend to hold a higher fraction
of money in their portfolio and decrease the proportions held of remaining assets if p⋅Y r
v
increases, and vice versa.
In sum, the demand for values according to the different asset classes is given by:
Md =m(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W(48)
∂m
∂iB
< 0, ∂m
∂iE
< 0, ∂m
∂îF
< 0, ∂m
∂σ̂
< 0, ∂m
∂( p⋅Y r
v
) > 0
BdP = b(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y rv ) ⋅W(49)
∂b
∂iB
> 0, ∂b
∂iE
< 0, ∂b
∂îF
< 0, ∂b
∂σ̂
< 0, ∂b
∂( p⋅Y r
v
) < 0
Ed = e(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W(50)
∂e
∂iB
< 0, ∂e
∂iE
> 0, ∂e
∂îF
< 0, ∂e
∂σ̂
< 0, ∂e
∂( p⋅Y r
v
) < 0
20E. g., after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, it was unclear how the financial systems of the
US and closely connected countries may withstand this shock due to the complex and abstruse position of
Lehman Brothers within their financial industries. This increase in uncertainty compared to less affected
countries would be captured by an increase in σ̂ within the model.
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sF dP = f(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y rv ) ⋅W(51)
∂f
∂iB
< 0, ∂f
∂iE
< 0, ∂f
∂îF
> 0, ∂f
∂σ̂
> 0, ∂f
∂( p⋅Y r
v
) < 0
The private households’ demand concerning the quantity of domestic bonds ((nBP )d) is
derived by dividing BdP by the price of one domestic bond (see equation 22). Multiplying
Ed by the equity discount rate, we then get the demand for domestic dividend payments
(Divd). Finally, by dividing sF dP by the foreign asset price (see equation 23) in domestic
currency, the demand for the quantity of foreign bonds ((nFP )d) is obtained:
(nBP )d = b(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y rv ) ⋅W ⋅ iBqB(52)
Divd = e(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅ iE(53)
(nFP )d = f(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y rv ) ⋅W ⋅ îFs ⋅ qF(54)
G. Equilibrium Conditions
Short Term
In the short term, the model shows four equilibrium conditions. Looking at the money
market first, it is necessary under the condition of the Quantity Equation 24 that the
domestic money amount (M) is equal to money demand (see equation 48) and money
supply (see equation 621):
(55) M = p ⋅ Y r
v
=m(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W =M + dn̂BCB ⋅ pB + dn̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ pF
Secondly, in reference to the domestic bond market, it is necessary that private house-
holds’ amount of domestic bonds (nBP ) is equal to demand (see equation 52) and short
term supply (see equation 27):
(56) nBP = b(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y rv ) ⋅W ⋅ iBqB = nB − n̂BCB
Thirdly, in the dividend market, it is necessary that private households’ claim for
dividend payments (Div) is equal to their demand (see equation 53), as well as the
21In the short term, dK̂ = 0 (see rationale in section D). Consequently, short term money supply is
M + dn̂BCB ⋅ pB + dn̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ pF .
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amount of dividend payments available in the short term (see equation 37):
(57) Div = e(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅ iE =M ⋅ v − iK ⋅ K̂ − qB ⋅ nB
Finally, in the foreign asset market, the amount of private households foreign assets
(nFP ) must be equal to demand (see equation 54), as well as short term supply (see
equation 45):
(58) nFP = f(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y rv ) ⋅W ⋅ îFs ⋅ qF = nF − n̂FCB
In the short term, the credit amount (K̂) and the amounts of domestic assets (nB , nE)
are considered constant (see rationale in section D). Consequently, in connection with
equation 44, the total amount of foreign assets remains at the initial level (nF ).
The remaining endogenous variables are the domestic bond interest rate (iB), the
equity discount rate (iE), and the exchange rate (s). Through total differentiation of
the equilibrium conditions 56, 57, and 58, and the following system of linear equations,
the changes in iB , iE , and s can be simultaneously determined. Due to Walras’ Law,
the money market condition 55 does not need to be considered. The result is that
changes in (short term) exogenous variables like the interest rate on foreign assets (îF ), the
relative macroeconomic risk (σ̂), the credit interest rate (iK), and central bank holdings
of domestic bonds (n̂BCB) and foreign assets (n̂
F
CB) affect the endogenous variables and
consequently private households’ wealth (W ) in the short term.
Long Term
In the long term, the money market condition changes slightly compared to the short
term as the central bank is able to adjust credit supply:
(59) M =m(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W = p ⋅ Y r
v
=M + dK̂ + dn̂BCB ⋅ pB + dn̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ pF
Moreover, the domestic bond market condition changes as the total supply of domestic
bonds adjusts in the long term (see equation 33):
(60) nBP = b(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y rv ) ⋅W ⋅ iBqB = dc ⋅M ⋅ v − iB ⋅ K̂qB − n̂BCB
The amount of domestic dividend payments adjusts in the long term as well (see equa-
tion 38). Therefore, the equilibrium condition concerning domestic dividend payments
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is:
(61) Div = e(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y r
v
) ⋅W ⋅ iE =M ⋅ v ⋅ (1 − dc)
In addition, the foreign asset market condition 58 adjusts seeing as the long term supply
of foreign assets is required (see equation 46):
(62) nFP = f(iB , iE , îF , σ̂, p ⋅ Y rv ) ⋅W ⋅ îFs ⋅ qF = nF − n̂FCB + dnF
A stable, long term general equilibrium must be connected with purchasing power
parity due to private households’ maximising real consumption (see rationale in section
D on page 14). A necessary condition for long term equilibrium (in addition to the market
conditions) is therefore:
(63) s = p
p̂∗
With regard to the Quantity Equation (see equation 24) and the production function
(see equation 17), equation 63 can be expressed by:
(64) s = M ⋅ v
a ⋅ nCG ⋅ p̂∗
In the long term, changes in nE are derived if changes in nB and nF are determined,
and exogenous changes in K̂ are given (see equation 44). Changes in nB and nF consist,
in turn, of exogenous changes in n̂BCB and n̂
F
CB , and endogenous changes in n
B
P and n
F
P
(see equations 19 and 20).
To solve for all endogenous variables, it is therefore sufficient to simultaneously derive
the changes in iB , iE , s, nBP , and n
F
P by using the equilibrium conditions 60, 61, and
62, as well as the purchasing power parity condition 64. This results in changes in most
of the exogenous variables, which also have an impact in the short term (îF , σ̂, n̂BCB ,
n̂FCB), as well as the credit amount (K̂) and the foreign price level (p̂
∗) affecting the
endogenous variables in the long term. Since the domestic asset amounts, and therefore
the amount of domestic investments, vary in the long term (see equation 15), not only
private households’ wealth (W ), but also the real domestic production (Y r) may adjust
to changes in the exogenous variables.
21
II. Model Solution
A. Fundamental Effects
The impact of changes in exogenous and endogenous variables can be differentiated
by four effects. Three effects are related to the demand side. In the following, these are
termed the allocation effect, wealth effect, and value compensation effect respectively.
The allocation effect captures the fraction of changes in asset demand attributed to
private households’ portfolio adjustments. Portfolio adjustments take place if private
households alter the proportions of the assets held in their aggregate portfolio (m, b, e,
and f). For example, if the foreign interest rate (îF ) increases exogenously, a higher
proportion of their portfolio tends to be in foreign assets (f), with a lower proportion of
the remaining assets (m, b, and e) respectively. Consequently, the demand for foreign
assets increases, and the demand for the remaining assets decreases. This relationship
is analogous if an exogenous shock leads, for example, to an endogenous increase in the
domestic bond interest rate (iB). Consequently, private households tend to increase b at
the cost of m, e, and f . Since the portfolio proportions depend on iB , iE , îF , σ̂, and
p⋅Y r
v
(see equations 48, 49, 50, and 51), the allocation effect results if changes in these
variables occur.
The wealth effect captures the fraction of changes in asset demand based on changes
in the total level of private households’ wealth (W ). If W decreases (e. g., from an
exogenous increase in îF or an endogenous decrease in nBP ), private households’ demand
for quantities of all asset types decreases proportionally, and vice versa (see equations 48,
52, 53, and 54). Since W depends on M , iB , iE , îF , s, nBP , Div, and n
F
P ,
22 the wealth
effect results if changes in these variables take place.
The value compensation effect captures the fraction of changes in asset demand based
on changes in the value of one asset type relative to the others. For example, if the foreign
interest rate (îF ) increases exogenously, the value of foreign assets decreases by a higher
fraction than the total level of private households’ wealth. Consequently, the proportion
of foreign assets (f) held in the portfolio decreases relative to the others. To compensate
for the relative loss in value so that the initial portfolio composition is maintained, private
households’ demand for foreign assets increases and the demand for the remaining assets
decreases respectively. In sum, the value compensation effect occurs if changes in iB , iE ,
îF , or s take place.
Besides the three demand effects, there is also a supply effect capturing changes in
the amount of assets. For example, the supply of domestic bonds decreases vis-a`-vis
the private households if the central bank increases its amount of domestic bonds (see
equations 27 and 33). All in all, the supply effect is present if changes in M , nBP , Div,
and nFP take place.
22Equation 10 can be written as W =M + nBP ⋅qB
iB
+ Div
iE
+ nFP ⋅s⋅qF
îF
.
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Table 1—Impact of Changes in the Exogenous Variables in the Short Term
diB/ diE/ ds/ dW / dp/
/dσ̂ ⋛ 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0 b = 0
/dîF ⋛ 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0 b = 0
/diK ⋛ 0 < 0 ⋛ 0 < 0 = 0
/dn̂BCB < 0 a > 0 a ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0
/dn̂FCB ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0 a > 0 > 0
a Given reasonable values of portfolio fraction elasticities.
b Given ∂m
∂σ̂
σ̂
m
, and respectively ∂m
∂îF
îF
m
, differ sufficiently from 0.
B. Impact of Changes in Exogenous Variables
General Outline
Changes in exogenous variables cause demand or supply effects which lead to excess
demand or excess supply on the respective asset markets. Consequently, the endogenous
variables adjust in order to produce opposing demand and supply effects that compensate
for the imbalances, thus achieving general equilibrium once again. To determine the ex-
ogenous impacts, the equilibrium conditions are totally differentiated, and the respective
systems of linear equations for the short term and the long term are solved. Table 1 gives
an overview of the short term impact of changes in the exogenous variables, while table
2 summarises the impacts with respect to the long term. In relation to the tables, it is
also important to note that the values of the portfolio fraction elasticities are considered
reasonable if, for example, the value of ∂b
∂iE
iE
b
is similar compared to ∂m
∂iE
iE
m
and ∂f
∂iE
iE
f
,
etc. The values of dc and v are considered reasonable if dc ⋅ v > iB .23
23The solving of the model is described in detail by a supplemental paper available on the IQSS
Dataverse http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/schueder. Therein, the solutions are available in explicit
formulas (e. g., useful for simulating the model results). Likewise, it is proven that the short term system
and the long term system are truly dynamically stable, following the approach by Metzler (1945). See
also the review of Hands (2010) on stability tests for general equilibrium models.
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Table 2—Impact of Changes in the Exogenous Variables in the Long Term
diB/ diE/ ds/ dnFP / dnBP / dW / dY r/ dp/
/dσ̂ ⋛ 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 b < 0 > 0
/dîF ⋛ 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 > 0 ⋛ 0 > 0 b < 0 > 0
/dp̂∗ = 0 = 0 < 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 < 0 > 0
/dK̂ > 0 a > 0 a > 0 a < 0 a > 0 a > 0 > 0 a > 0 a
/dn̂BCB > 0 a > 0 a > 0 a < 0 a > 0 a > 0 > 0 a > 0 a
/dn̂FCB > 0 a > 0 a > 0 a < 0 a > 0 a > 0 > 0 a > 0 a
a Given reasonable values of portfolio fraction elasticities, dc, and v.
b Given ∂m
∂σ̂
σ̂
m
, and respectively ∂m
∂îF
îF
m
, differ sufficiently from 0.
External Influence on Domestic Variables
Subsequently, the impact of changes in variables which are not under the control of
the central bank (σ̂, îF , and p̂∗) are now looked at, with changes in these variables being
termed external shocks.24
If an increase in domestic macroeconomic risk leads to a relative risk increase (dσ̂ >
0), the risk averse private households tend to increase their exposure to foreign assets
(increase in f) at the cost of domestic assets (decrease in m, b, and e). This behaviour is
based on risk-return considerations. Consequently, the initial disturbance of an increase
in σ̂ consists of an allocation effect. The increasing demand for foreign assets causes
an increase in demand for foreign currency, with the exchange rate therefore increasing
endogenously. The increase in the exchange rate induces a wealth effect, which positively
affects the demand for all asset types, and a value compensation effect, which negatively
affects the demand for foreign assets, and positively affects the demand for domestic
assets. In the short term, through this exchange rate increase a new equilibrium is
obtained to the extent that the initial allocation effect is entirely compensated by the
endogenous wealth effect and the value compensation effect. Thereby, no changes in
domestic interest rates emerge if the elasticity of m, with respect to σ̂, corresponds to the
respective elasticities of b and e. However, the domestic bond interest rate, as well as the
equity discount rate, may increase if b and e are more negatively affected by an increase in
σ̂ than m (in relative terms), and vice versa. Subsequently, if private households consider
24Subsequently, exogenous increases in σ̂, îF , and p̂∗ are discussed. The conclusions hold vice versa if
decreases in σ̂, îF , and p̂∗ are considered.
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money as risk free (or nearly risk free)25, an increase in σ̂ has a positive impact on iB
and iE , and a less positive impact on s, since the increases in iB and iE negatively affect
the demand for foreign assets again. In sum, private households’ wealth increases in the
short term in reaction to dσ̂ > 0, assuming the positive wealth effect produced by ds > 0
is not exceeded by potential negative wealth effects caused by diB > 0 and diE > 0. The
domestic price level is not affected since an increase in σ̂ neither influences the domestic
money amount nor real domestic production in the short term.
When interpreting the long term effects, it is essential to consider that the short term
increase in the exchange rate has made the consumption of foreign goods relatively more
expensive.26 Consequently, private households optimise their consumption composition,
substituting imports of foreign goods by exchanging equity assets in return for domestic
goods from the producers (see equation 41). The current account surpluses which are
realised cause, on the one hand, an excess supply of foreign currency so that the exchange
rate decreases. On the other hand, they are used to acquire additional foreign assets.
Consequently, over time the wealth effect and the value compensation effect caused by the
short term increase in the exchange rate convert for the most part into a long term wealth
effect, as well as a long term supply effect through the increase in the amount of foreign
assets. However, the exchange rate does not retrieve its initial value. Since the amount
of real domestic investments (nCG) decreases due to the exchange of equity assets (see
equation 15)27, real domestic production (Y r) also decreases. Consequently, the domestic
price level increases (see equation 25) to the extent that in the new long term equilibrium,
purchasing power parity is obtained with a higher exchange rate than before. All in all,
private households’ wealth increases due to the positive wealth effects resulting from the
increase in the amount of foreign assets and the increase in the exchange rate. However,
this is only the case if the effects are not overcompensated by negative wealth effects
related to an increase in iB , an associated decrease in nBP , and an increase in i
E .28
In sum, the resulting disinvestment in domestic real capital goods in reaction to the
increase in σ̂ is a logical consequence of private households’ investment behaviour. If
domestic investments become relatively riskier, risk averse investors will relocate capital
by investing in relatively less risky projects abroad until their investment portfolio is
balanced again.
An increase in the foreign interest rate (îF ) has a similar impact on the endogenous
variables, much like an increase in σ̂. The difference is that the initial disturbance of
dîF > 0 consists of a wealth effect and a value compensation effect in addition to the
25 ∂m
∂σ̂
σ̂
m
would be zero or close to zero.
26A decrease in the real exchange rate (sreal) results, see equation 40.
27Furthermore, the supply of domestic bonds is negatively affected in the long term if the domestic
bond interest rate increases in the short term (this is the case if ∂m
∂σ̂
σ̂
m
is zero or close to zero). In this
case, additional domestic disinvestments take place due to the long term decrease in nB (see equation
32).
28Overcompensation would occur if private households consider money to be risk free or nearly risk
free ( ∂m
∂σ̂
σ̂
m
would be zero or close to zero).
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allocation effect. However, the exchange rate also increases in the short term, which
balances out demand and supply. Likewise, the amount of real domestic investments
decreases in the long term since foreign investments become relatively more attractive.
However, the reason for real domestic disinvestment is not based on changes in the relative
risk, but on changes in the relative return on investment projects.
An increase in the foreign price level (p̂∗) has no short term effect within the model.
However, foreign goods become relatively more expensive compared to domestic goods.
Consequently, private households adjust their consumption composition over the long
term. They exchange equity assets in return for domestic goods to allow for the sub-
stitution of foreign imports (see equation 41). A current account surplus is obtained,
causing the exchange rate to decrease. The private households thus acquire additional
foreign assets to compensate for the relative loss in the value of foreign assets.29 Overall,
the negative wealth effect connected to ds < 0 compensates for the positive wealth effect
connected to dnFP > 0, with the result therefore being that private households’ wealth
remains unchanged. That being said, the real amount of domestic capital investments
decreases, also causing real domestic production to decrease. Finally, the new long term
general equilibrium is characterised by a lower exchange rate and a higher domestic price
level compared to the initial situation.
As was the case before, the real domestic disinvestment caused by the increase in the
foreign price level are comprehensible from an investor’s perspective. It is reasonable to
shift real investments internationally if a relatively higher value added can be realised
abroad.
Central Bank’s Influence on Domestic Variables
The central bank is able to influence the endogenous variables by changing their policy
variables iK (in the short term), K̂ (in the long term), n̂BCB , and n̂
F
CB .
30
If the central bank increases the credit interest rate (iK) in the short term, it reduces
the amount of domestic dividend payments (see equation 37).31 On the one hand, the
reduction in Div produces a negative wealth effect, causing the demand for all asset types
to decrease. On the other hand, the negative supply effect produces an excess demand for
domestic dividend payments, and as a consequence, the equity discount rate decreases
endogenously so that the excess demand for domestic dividend payments is primarily
balanced by the resulting value compensation effect. Besides the value compensation
effect, the excess supply of the remaining asset types is primarily balanced by the related
29The negative wealth effect and the value compensation effect caused by the decrease in the exchange
rate is compensated by the positive wealth effect and the supply effect connected to the increase in the
amount of foreign assets.
30Subsequently, exogenous increases in iK , K̂, n̂BCB , and n̂
F
CB are discussed. The conclusions hold
vice versa if decreases in these variables are considered.
31Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show empirically, that an unexpected 25 basis point decrease in the
federal funds rate causes an 1% increase in stock prices, and vice versa. They identified changes in
(future) dividend payments being a likely reason for these changes in stock prices, as is the case within
the current model.
26
wealth and allocation effects.32 In total, private households’ wealth is lower in the short
term equilibrium than it was in the initial situation. Finally, credit demand becomes
elastic over the long term33, and iK decreases to its initial value so that the long term
equilibrium is equal to the initial situation. Consequently, a sole short term increase in
iK has no long term impact on the endogenous variables.
If the central bank increases the credit amount in the long term34, it directly increases
the money supply and thus the money amount held in private households’ portfolio (see
equation 4 and equilibrium condition 59). The increase in the money supply produces a
wealth effect and a supply effect. Since the domestic price level increases proportionally
(see equation 25), the increase in p⋅Y r
v
produces a balancing allocation effect. When
considered on its own, it consequently follows that increases in the money supply have a
neutral effect on the endogenous variables iB , iE , s, nFP , and n
B
P while increasing W and
p. However, increases in the money supply also increase the amount of dividend payments
(see equation 38) and the supply of domestic bonds35. The excess supply of domestic
dividend payments causes an increase in the equity discount rate. In addition, the excess
supply of domestic bonds causes the domestic bond interest rate to increase. Furthermore,
the private households optimise their consumption composition in reaction to the increase
in the domestic price level by increasing their demand for foreign imports. Through
the connected increase in demand for foreign currency, the exchange rate increases and
foreign assets are sold. Going hand in hand with this is the exchange of domestically
produced goods for equity assets from the producers. In sum, the increase in the amount
of credit, domestic bonds and domestic equity assets causes an increase in real domestic
investment (see equation 15) at the cost of foreign investment (see equation 44). In the
new long term equilibrium, private households hold a lower amount of foreign assets for
two reasons: firstly because of the increase in domestic interest rates, and secondly due
to the increase in the exchange rate. Furthermore, private households’ wealth increases
because of the net positive wealth effects, and finally, real domestic production increases
due to the increase in nCG.
A purchase of domestic bonds by the central bank (dn̂BCB > 0) increases the money
supply in the short term. By again considering the partial impact, the resulting increase
in the money supply has a neutral effect on the endogenous variables iB , iE , and s, while
increasing W and p. However, in acquiring domestic bonds, the central bank decreases
the domestic bond supply vis-a`-vis the private households. Furthermore, the increase in
the money supply produces an increase in domestic dividend payments. Consequently,
32Thereby, no changes in the domestic bond interest rate or in the exchange rate are required. The
domestic bond interest rate only decreases if the demand for domestic bonds is more positively affected
by a decrease in iE than the demand for foreign assets, and vice versa. Concerning the exchange rate,
the relationship applies analogically in the case of the demand for foreign assets.
33By assumption, the money view holds in the long term.
34A short term increase in K̂ is not feasible since in the short term, the demand for loans is inelastic
according to the credit view.
35The increase in the bond supply is definite if the reasonable proposition dc ⋅ v > iB is implied (see
equation 33).
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the excess demand for domestic bonds is balanced by a decrease in the domestic bond
interest rate, while the excess supply of dividend payments is balanced by an increase in
the equity discount rate. Thus, short term equilibrium is characterised by an increase in
W , p, and iE , a decrease in iB , while the reaction of s is ambiguous.36
In the long term, private households optimise their consumption composition in re-
action to the increase in p. Furthermore, domestic producers increase the bond supply
due to the short term decrease in iB , and the lasting increase in the money supply (see
equation 32). Considering all effects together, an increase in n̂BCB has the same long term
impact on the endogenous variables as an increase in K̂.37 This result is obvious since in
the long term, producers consider bonds and loans as perfect substitutes, following the
money view.
If the central bank acquires additional foreign assets (dn̂FCB > 0) in the short term, the
domestic price level and dividend payments increase because of the increase in the money
supply. In response, the excess supply of dividend payments is balanced by an endogenous
increase in the equity discount rate. Furthermore, the increase in n̂FCB decreases the short
term supply of foreign assets vis-a`-vis the private households. Consequently, the resulting
excess demand for foreign assets produces an excess demand for foreign currency, with the
exchange rate increasing as result. The exchange rate increases until the decrease in f ,
produced by the lower amount of foreign assets held by private households, is sufficiently
compensated for. In this case, the excess demand for foreign assets is now balanced in
the short term.38
The long term effects of dn̂FCB > 0 are qualitatively the same as the long term effects
of dK̂ > 0 and dn̂BCB > 0. However, the quantitative impact is different. With dK̂ > 0
and dn̂BCB > 0, the central bank increases the demand for domestic debt assets, thereby
putting pressure on the interest rates on producers’ debt liabilities in the short term.
Therefore, domestic producers’ motivation to increase the amount of debt liabilities is
twofold, with the first reason being connected to the increase in the money supply and
the second reason being based on central bank pressure on the interest rates on debt
liabilities (see equations 26 and 32). In the case of an increase in n̂FCB , only the first
reason has relevance. For long term equilibrium, the result is that for each money unit
created by dn̂FCB > 0, the increase in the total amount of domestic bonds is less, and the
increase in the domestic bond interest rate is higher compared to dK̂ > 0 and dn̂BCB > 0.
Therefore, the increase in the real amount of domestic capital goods is less in the case
of dn̂FCB > 0. Consequently, the increase in real domestic production is smaller, and the
increase in the domestic price level is higher. Finally, purchasing power parity is obtained
with a higher exchange rate than in the case of dK̂ > 0 and dn̂BCB > 0.
36The exchange rate (s) is only positively affected by the intervention, if the decrease in iB effects
the demand for foreign assets to this extent positively that the negative effect from the increase in iE is
overcompensated for (and vice versa).
37Given an identical increase in the money amount connected with both interventions.
38Only if the increase in iE has an exceptionally strongly negative effect on the demand for foreign
assets, there is a chance that the exchange rate will decrease (temporarily) in the short term as well.
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III. Monetary Policy Interventions and Trade-Offs
A. Implementation of Monetary Policy
As demonstrated in the previous section, domestic variables can be influenced by ex-
ogenous changes in external variables (σ̂, îF , and p̂∗) which are not controlled by the
central bank. If the central bank is to maintain a certain target value, for example for
the exchange rate, the domestic price level, or real domestic production, this target may
not be achieved in the short term, or even the long term, due to external shocks. However,
the central bank is able to adjust its policy variables with the goal of compensating for
their impact. That being said, an intervention stabilising one variable may have desta-
bilising side effects on other variables. Because of this, the trade-offs connected with
monetary policy interventions will be analysed on the basis of two strategies which are
applied in practice: expansive interventions in times of economic crises and exchange rate
stabilisation.
B. Expansive Monetary Interventions
Expansive Monetary Policy during Economic Crises
Generally, economies are affected by a high level of risk in times of economic crises
(Schwert, 1989; Mishkin, 2001; Angeletos and Werning, 2006). For example, since the
start of the financial crisis in 2007, the financial markets of various advanced economies
experienced massive distortions. Through the burst of the U.S. housing bubble and the
collapse of Northern Rock and Lehman Brothers, a high amount of systemic risk has
become prevalent. Concerning the model used in this paper, it is possible to trace the
substantial decline in the British Pound (starting in September 2007) back to the increase
in Britain’s relative macroeconomic risk (σ̂) caused by the bank run on Northern Rock.
Taking Europe and the United States into account, the decline in equity indices and the
pressure on bond markets following the collapse of Lehman Brothers would imply that
money was less affected by the increase in macroeconomic risk compared to bonds and
equity assets. In sum, it is highly probable that negative wealth effects have prevailed,
decreasing the wealth of private households.
Central banks have often reacted to financial and economic distortions by relaxing
banking restrictions and using expansive monetary policy.39 Over the course of the recent
financial crisis, central banks reduced interest rates, expanded the credit supply and,
especially as interest rates approached the zero lower bound, carried out open market
purchases of domestic assets. The U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of England in
particular expanded their balance sheets through acquiring a variety of domestic debt
securities, mainly in the form of long term government bonds, but also commercial papers
39See, e. g., Minsky (1986) and Neely (2003) who discuss the reaction of the U.S. Federal Reserve to
several crises.
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and mortgage-backed securities (Klyuev et al., 2009). These interventions are also referred
to as ‘quantitative easing’ (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004; Bernanke et al., 2004).40
The Impact of Expansive Monetary Interventions
In terms of the presented model, expansive monetary interventions are open market
purchases of domestic bonds and increases in the credit supply. Subsequently, it is anal-
ysed to what extent these interventions, and the connected liquidity provision, help to
mitigate the impact of an increase in domestic macroeconomic risk (σ̂). Without central
bank intervention, the model implies that an increase in σ̂ may be connected with a de-
crease in private households’ wealth in the short term.41 In the long term, real domestic
disinvestments take place, causing a decrease in real domestic production.
In the short term, the impact of an open market purchase of domestic bonds is different
compared to an expansion of credit lending. Through a purchase of domestic bonds, the
central bank decreases the domestic bond supply vis-a`-vis the private households, thereby
taking over a part of the increased domestic risk on its balance sheet. As a consequence,
there is less domestic risk in the market, causing a decline in risk premiums while the
price of domestic bonds increases.42 Furthermore, the increase in liquidity produces an
increase in dividend payments. As a result, equity prices increase on the one hand, while
the excess supply of dividend payments is balanced again by an increase in iE on the
other. Since diB < 0 positively affects the demand for foreign assets, and diE > 0 has a
negative impact, the exchange rate is not necessarily affected in the short term. Finally,
the negative wealth effects connected with the decrease in nBP and the increase in i
E , are
outweighed by the positive wealth effects connected with the decrease in iB , the increase
in Div and the increase in M . Consequently, possible negative wealth effects caused by
dσ̂ > 0 can be compensated for by an increase in n̂BCB in the short term. However, this
is only possible at the cost of an increase in the domestic price level, which is produced
by the expansion of the money supply (see equations 25 and 6). Furthermore, domestic
interest rates are distorted, no longer reflecting the changes in the external economic
conditions.
Due to the implications of the money view, the central bank is not able to increase the
amount of credit in the short term. However, if it tends to increase credit lending in the
long term, it needs to reduce the credit interest rate in the short term in order to offer
incentives for additional borrowing. Through a decrease in the credit interest rate, the
amount of dividend payments increases (see equation 37). Consequently, equity prices
and the equity discount rate increase, while the bond interest rate and the exchange
rate are not necessarily affected. Compared to a purchase of bonds, the wealth effect is
40See also the discussion on the term ‘quantitative easing’ in Klyuev et al., 2009, pg. 9.
41If ∂m
∂σ̂
σ̂
m
is zero or close to zero, see last chapter.
42Borio and Zhu (2008) refer to this as the ‘risk-taking channel’ of monetary policy, which was seen as
important during the recent central bank interventions (Klyuev et al., 2009). For example, the negative
impact of recent open market purchases on bond interest rates is illustrated by Gagnon et al. (2010) in
the case of the U.S. and Joyce et al. (2010) in the case of Britain.
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less pronounced since no substantial decrease in the domestic bond interest rate is to be
expected in the short term.
However, the long term implications of an open market purchase of domestic bonds
and an increase in the credit amount are the same. Due to the decrease either in the bond
or in the credit interest rate, as well as the increase in dividend payments, the domestic
bond supply and the credit demand increases in the long term in accordance with the
static trade-off theory and the credit view (see equation 32). By increasing the amount
of credit, the central bank takes over domestic risk on its balance sheet. In addition, the
money supply increases causing an increase in the domestic price level.
Consequently, both types of expansive monetary interventions increase the amount of
producers debt liabilities, resulting in an increase in the amount of real domestic in-
vestments (see equation 15). However, the domestic bond interest rate also increases
in reaction to the resulting excess supply of domestic bonds, eventually causing bond
and credit interest rates to exceed the initial value which existed before the expansive
monetary interventions (see table 2). Through private households’ adjustment in con-
sumption behaviour, current account deficits and an increase in the exchange rate occur.
Furthermore, an additional increase in the amount of real domestic investments follows,
witnessed through the increasing amount of domestic equity assets. The final result is
that the imminent real domestic disinvestments caused by dσ̂ > 0 can be averted in the
long term through expansive monetary interventions.
The Trade-Offs of Expansive Monetary Interventions
As demonstrated, through an open market purchase of domestic bonds, or an increase
in the credit supply, central banks are able to avert two crucial consequences of an increase
in domestic macroeconomic risk. First, a negative wealth effect caused by a decline in
bond and equity indices can be alleviated in the short term, primarily through open
market purchases of domestic bonds. Second, impending real domestic disinvestments
can be avoided since expansive monetary interventions produce increases in the amount
of real domestic investments (attributed to increases in the amount of debt and equity
assets). The long term impacts of both types of expansive monetary interventions are
theoretically the same. However, open market purchases of domestic bonds may be
more effective in practice if the short term possibilities to decrease credit interest rates
are limited near the zero lower bound. The reason for this is that a higher amount of
credit will only be swiftly accepted by producers if borrowing becomes noticeably more
attractive in the short term through a substantial decrease in the credit interest rate,
which may be close to impossible near the zero lower bound.
However, side effects arise which lead one to question whether aggregate welfare is
positively affected overall by expansive monetary interventions. For example, the price
level of domestic goods rises due to the increase in the money supply. The welfare impact
of increases in the price level is generally considered to be negative in the literature,
particularly if they are persistent (Lucas, 2000; Lagos and Rocheteau, 2005; Burstein and
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Hellwig, 2008). In addition, the increase in the domestic price level is the underlying
reason for a long term devaluation of the domestic currency. Consequently, additional
exchange rate volatility occurs, which may cause increased costs of currency hedging.
Fluctuations in the interest rates on debt capital may also bear long term risks for (highly)
indebted institutions. If, for example, the government considers the short term decrease in
bond interest rates (after an open market purchase) to be persistent, financing investment
and social projects with a relatively low return through the issue of bonds, they may run
into problems with a long term increase in bond interest rates. More precisely, it is
possible that the liquidity of indebted institutions will become severely endangered from
a long term perspective, given a low budgetary foresight. Regarding the central bank, it
takes on domestic risk on its balance sheet by purchasing domestic bonds and expanding
the credit amount. Since the central bank can be considered as a crucial institution
within a state, it may itself become a source of macroeconomic risk. However, to date
it is unclear what level of intervention can lead to an inadequately diversified cluster
of domestic risk on its balance sheet. Finally, expansive monetary interventions cause
an inefficient international allocation of real capital. If domestic macroeconomic risk
increases, domestic investments become less attractive compared to foreign investments.
Consequently, it would be suitable to reduce the amount of domestic investments. If
the central bank takes on the increased in domestic risk through expansive monetary
interventions, it averts the domestic disinvestment at the cost of foreign investments.
In a nutshell, the impact of expansive monetary interventions on domestic welfare is
ambiguous in times of economic crises. A proper assessment of their impact may only be
possible on a case to case basis. However, it is reasonable to conclude that world welfare
is negatively affected by expansive monetary interventions due to the resulting inefficient
international allocation of real capital investments.
C. Exchange Rate Stabilisation
General Remarks
It is commonly observed that many countries do not float their currencies, intervening
in order to stabilise the exchange rate. The extent to which a country stabilises its
currency in relation to foreign currencies is expressed by its exchange rate regime. Even
though there is much debate about how exchange rate regimes of countries should be
classified (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005), it is clear
that exchange rate stabilisation continues to this day.
An advantage of stabilised exchange rates is the lower transaction costs in regards to
currency hedging. Consequently, low exchange rate volatility tends to foster international
trade (Ozturk, 2006). On the other hand, the central bank has to maintain the exchange
rate target, thereby losing monetary policy autonomy (Shambaugh, 2004; Obstfeld et al.,
2005). Despite this, a new dimension in the discussion regarding exchange rate regimes
has emerged by analysing the trade-offs associated with stabilisation interventions within
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the current model. The following shows that exchange rate stabilisation is related to the
stabilisation of the real amount of domestic investments.
The Impact of Exchange Rate Stabilisation
Within the model, we can analyse how central bank interventions, which are applied in
order to avert devaluations of the domestic currency in reaction to external shocks, affect
the economy. In the short term, the exchange rate increases (ds > 0) if there is a relative
increase in domestic macroeconomic risk (dσ̂ > 0), or through an increase in the foreign
interest rate (dîF > 0). The reason for this is that domestic private households tend to
hold a higher proportion of foreign assets in their portfolio, therefore demanding foreign
currency to allow for purchases of foreign assets. To avoid a short term increase in the
exchange rate, the central bank has to avert these foreign asset purchases through the
capital account. This is possible by satisfying demand, i. e. supplying their own stocks of
foreign assets (dn̂FCB < 0). However, with dn̂FCB < 0, the domestic amount of money (M)
would be negatively affected, and the domestic price level (p), the amount of dividend
payments (Div), and the equity discount rate (iE) would decrease as a consequence (see
equations 4, 25, and 37 and table 1). Furthermore, a decrease in the domestic price level
would produce an appreciation of the domestic currency since purchasing power parity
holds in the long term. To avert these side effects, the central bank needs to purchase
domestic bonds. Through a so called sterilised intervention, the impact on the amount
of money is completely neutralised.43 However, through the purchase of domestic bonds,
the central bank negatively affects the domestic bond interest rate. The result here is
that the impact on the domestic money amount cannot be neutralised by the central
bank without also having an influence on the domestic bond interest rate in the short
term.
In the long term, the real amount of domestic capital investments would decrease
following a relative increase in the domestic macroeconomic risk (dσ̂ > 0), or an increase
in the foreign interest rate (dîF > 0). The reason for this is that private households
adjust their consumption composition due to the short term increase in the exchange
rate, whereby the amount of domestic equity assets is reduced (see equation 41). The
real amount of domestic investment therefore decreases (see equation 15). If the central
bank averts the short term increase in the exchange rate without changing the money
supply, no incentive remains to reduce the amount of equity assets. Hence, the real
amount of domestic investments is not affected by changes in the amount of equity assets
either. That being said, the supply of domestic bonds may change if the domestic bond
interest rate adjusts overall. Thus, minor decreases or increases in the real amount
43This is the case if dM < 0, caused by dn̂FCB < 0, corresponds to dM > 0, caused by dn̂BCB > 0. In this
case, it must hold that dn̂FCB ⋅ s ⋅ qFîF + dn̂BCB ⋅ qBiB = 0.
33
of domestic investments may result in the long term due to changes in the amount of
domestic bonds.44
In the long term, changes in the foreign price level (p̂∗) have an impact on the exchange
rate (s) as well. If the foreign price level increases, domestic private households adjust
their consumption composition according to the real exchange rate (see equation 41).
Here, they substitute the relatively expensive foreign imports for domestic goods, thereby
reducing the amount of equity assets and the real amount of domestic investments. The
resulting surplus on the current account produces a decrease in s. The central bank
is able to avert the appreciation of the domestic currency by increasing the domestic
price level (p) through reflationary monetary interventions, such as K̂ > 0, n̂BCB > 0, or
n̂FCB > 0. By increasing p, no incentive remains for private households to adjust their
consumption composition. Consequently, the real amount of domestic investments (nCG)
is not affected by changes in the amount of equity assets. Nevertheless, nCG may increase
overall if the supply of domestic bonds is positively affected by the reflationary monetary
interventions (see footnote 44).
The Trade-Offs of Exchange Rate Stabilisation
In sum, sterilised interventions are required to avert exchange rate deviations, which
are caused by changes in σ̂ and îF . However, the domestic money supply needs to be
adjusted to sustainably neutralise exchange rate changes caused by changes in p̂∗. Both
types of interventions not only stabilise the exchange rate, but also avert changes in
the real amount of domestic investments which would otherwise be caused by external
shocks.45 Nonetheless, both types of interventions are connected with trade-offs possibly
affecting aggregate welfare.
Sterilised interventions represent asset swaps by the central bank. As a precondition for
sterilised interventions, it is necessary for the central bank to possess a sufficient amount
of domestic bonds or foreign assets so that the necessary transaction amount can be
carried out. By selling foreign assets and buying domestic bonds to avoid a devaluation
of the domestic currency, the central bank accumulates domestic risk on its balance
44 If iB increases following the external shock, and this increase is higher than the decrease follow-
ing central bank intervention, the supply of domestic bonds decreases in the long term. Consequently,
real domestic disinvestments take place, real domestic production decreases and the domestic price level
increases. The increase in the domestic price level would positively affect the exchange rate since pur-
chasing power parity holds in the long term. Hence, this impact on the exchange rate can be neutralised
by adequately decreasing the domestic money amount to the extent that the domestic price level remains
constant in the long term. This can be realised by decreasing the credit amount (K̂) or the central bank’s
amount of domestic bonds (n̂BCB). However, the decrease in the real amount of domestic investments
cannot be totally averted. From the reverse perspective, if an increase in iB is lower than the decrease
following the central bank interventions, or iB remains constant/decreases in reaction to the external
shock, the central bank has to sufficiently increase the domestic money supply over time in order to
stabilise the exchange rate in the long term. Still, an increase in the real amount of domestic investments
would remain.
45Only minor changes in the real amount of domestic investments may be expected because of changes
in the domestic bond supply.
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sheet. Consequently, the central bank may itself become a source of macroeconomic
risk if it builds up an inadequate cluster of domestic risks.46 By taking over domestic
risk, the central bank reduces the risk premium on domestic assets relative to foreign
assets. The result here is the stabilising of the amount of domestic equity assets, as
well as the lowering of the interest rate on domestic bonds, promoting increases in the
supply of domestic bonds. Therefore, the real amount of domestic capital investments
is stabilised, or even increased if the amount of domestic assets increases overall. As a
consequence, these sterilised interventions cause an inefficient international allocation of
real capital. If σ̂ or îF increase, domestic investments become less attractive compared
to foreign investments. For this reason, the real amount of domestic investments tends
to decrease. If the central bank takes over domestic risk through sterilised interventions,
it averts domestic disinvestments at the cost of foreign investments, thereby promoting
an inefficient international allocation of real capital.
Reflationary monetary interventions avert exchange rate changes caused by increases
in the foreign price level (p̂∗), however this comes at a cost, i. e. increases in the
domestic price level (p). In addition, these interventions hinder adequate adjustments
in the real amount of investments. If the price level of foreign goods increases, real
foreign investments produce a higher value added than before, thus become relatively
more attractive than domestic investments. As a consequence, domestic disinvestments
and foreign investments take place. If the central bank exerts reflationary monetary
interventions, it averts domestic disinvestments at the cost of foreign investments. The
result here is yet again an inefficient international allocation of real capital.47
To summarise, it is unclear whether exchange rate stabilisation has a positive impact
on domestic welfare. The stabilisation of the exchange rate and the real amount of do-
mestic investment goes hand in hand with either increasing risk clusters on the central
bank’s balance sheet, or with changes in the domestic price level. Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to conclude that world welfare is negatively affected by exchange rate stabil-
ising interventions due to the resulting inefficient international allocation of real capital
investments.
D. Empirical Estimation of Exchange Rate Stabilising Interventions
Method and Data
In this section, the exchange rate stabilising interventions of the central banks of three
European countries (namely Austria, Belgium, and Denmark) are analysed. For each
country, an impulse response analysis is performed based on an unrestricted vector au-
toregressive (VAR) estimation. By using this approach, it is possible to simulate short
46By purchasing foreign assets and selling domestic bonds to avert an appreciation of the domestic
currency, the central bank is, from the opposite perspective, in danger of accumulating an inadequate
cluster of foreign risk on its balance sheet.
47Through restrictive monetary interventions, the relations hold the other way round if the central
bank averts a devaluation of the domestic currency due to a decrease in the foreign price level.
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term deviations of the respective exchange rates, and consequently, to draw conclusions
from the reactions of the remaining variables in regards to exchange rate stabilising in-
terventions.
The VAR estimation is based on monthly financial data. For Austria and Belgium, the
time period before the Euro introduction is considered, in which the German Mark served
as the base currency. For Denmark, it is the time period after the Euro introduction, in
which the Euro represents the base currency for the Danish Crone.48 Each of the three
VARs is estimated with the time series of eight stationary variables. These reflect the
exchange rate in levels (s), governmental bond clean price indices (bonds), the MSCI
share market indices (msci), central banks’ amount of currency reserves (reserv), the
three month interbank interest rates (iK3m), the monetary aggregates M1 (M1), M3 less
M1 (M3−M1), and the consumer price indices (inf). The variable bonds represents the
growth rate of the domestic bond index, minus the growth rate of the base country bond
index in order to exclude common trends, caused by the business cycle in particular. The
same is true for msci, reserv, M1, M3−M1, and inf . Concerning iK3m, the difference
between the three month interbank interest rates is taken for the same reason. A constant
term, seasonal dummies and dummies concerning the German monetary union in 1990
are included as exogenous variables.49 Subsequently, the exchange rate is shocked by
one standard deviation and the accumulated responses are determined for a period of 18
months within the impulse response estimation.
Interpretation of Results against the Background of the Model
To interpret the output of the impulse response estimation, one needs to consider the
theoretical reasons for the initial exchange rate deviation. This is crucial since we would
expect sterilised interventions if the deviation of the exchange rate is based on changes
in σ̂ or îF . If it is based on changes in p̂∗, we would expect non-sterilised interventions.
However, by solely shocking s within the impulse response estimation, it is implied that
the change in s is caused by a change in σ̂ with respect to the current model with static
expectations.50 However, expectations may not always be static in practice (Frankel and
Froot, 1987).
If expectations are not static in particular circumstances, and domestic private house-
holds expect a future increase in the exchange rate based on a future increase in σ̂ or
48See plots of the exchange rates in figure A.1 of the appendix.
49See an overview of the VAR estimation settings and respective test statistics in tables A.3 and A.4
of the appendix. The respective EViews workfiles and a detailed description of the data sources are
available for download from the IQSS Dataverse http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/schueder.
50Changes in îF and p̂∗ must be connected with changes in bonds, msci, or inf . An increase in
îF would be connected with a relative decrease in foreign asset prices. Consequently, the bond and
stock indices of the foreign base country would decrease relative to the indices of the domestic country,
therefore bonds and msci would increase. If we only shock the exchange rate within the impulse response
estimation without shocking bonds and msci at the same time, we imply that the exchange rate shock
is not caused by a change in îF . The same holds for p̂∗ in connection with inf . Therefore, only changes
in σ̂ would explain the exchange rate deviation within the current model with static expectations.
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p̂∗ , the expected return on foreign assets increases. This consists of foreign interest pay-
ments plus the expected exchange rate profit. Due to the increase in the expected return,
the demand for foreign assets increases. Thereby, an increase in the exchange rate oc-
curs straightaway.51 Consequently, the initial increase in the exchange rate within the
impulse response estimation may either be theoretically based on an increase in σ̂, an
expected increase in σ̂, or an expected increase in p
p̂∗ . If an (expected) increase in σ̂ is the
reason, we would expect sterilised interventions by central banks in order to stabilise the
exchange rate. If an expected increase in p
p̂∗ is the reason, we would expect non-sterilised
interventions in turn.
Results and Interpretation
Figures 1 to 3 show the respective responses to a one standard deviation exchange rate
shock for Austria, Belgium, and Denmark.52 Only Austria and Denmark seem to clearly
51That is not necessarily the case if domestic private households expect a future increase in the
exchange rate based on a future increase in îF . The reason for this is that the change in the expected
return on foreign assets is indefinite in this case. It consists of foreign interest payments, plus the
expected exchange rate profit minus the price loss. Consequently, the demand for foreign assets does not
necessarily increase.
52For each impulse response estimation holds: accumulated responses, 18 periods, Monte Carlo simu-
lated response standard errors (100000 repetitions), Cholesky type: dof adjusted, Cholesky order (based
on theoretical model): iK3m, reserv, M1, M3−M1, inf , s, bonds, msci, Cholesky order does not drive
impulse response estimation results. The responses of M3 −M1 and inf can be found in figure A.2 of
the appendix.
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Figure 3. : Denmark
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sell currency reserves in reaction to a sudden devaluation of their currencies (decrease
in reserv). However, iK3m increases in Austria and Belgium, indicating a relatively
more restrictive credit supply.53 For each country, the domestic bond index loses value
compared to the base country (decrease in bonds), indicating a relative increase in the
domestic bond interest rate. This increase might be caused by a sale of domestic bonds
by the respective central banks, or by an increase in the domestic bond supply in re-
action to the more restrictive credit supply. Furthermore, the relative changes in the
domestic share indices have a negative trend (decrease in msci); this becomes especially
clear in the case of Belgium and Denmark. In a nutshell, the results imply that the
central banks predominantly carry out non-sterilised interventions to stabilise the ex-
change rate.54 Consequently, changes in expectations concerning p
p̂∗ are most likely the
prevalent reason for exchange rate changes in practice. This result is reasonable since
the economies analysed have similar economic structures to the base countries (Helg et
al., 1995). Therefore, it is unlikely that a divergent development of domestic and base
country macroeconomic risk has occurred during the considered time periods.
Nevertheless, differences in stabilising strategies can be observed which have an impact
on the effectiveness of interventions. Austria seems to be the only country which uses
currency reserves and credit supply adjustments to avert exchange rate deviations. The
coefficient of variation of its exchange rate is the lowest of the three countries at 0.03%.
Second is Denmark, which seems to predominantly use currency reserves to stabilise its
exchange rate. Its coefficient of variation is 0.16%. Belgium’s currency, at 0.90%, has
the highest coefficient of variation.55 Belgium seems to predominantly use adjustments
in the credit supply to avert exchange rate deviations. Besides possible differences in
the level of interventions, one explanation for the relative high coefficient of variation
compared to Austria and Denmark may be that interventions in the foreign asset market
are more effective as they have a short term impact on the exchange rate. In contrast,
adjustments in the credit supply are more effective in the long term, thus allowing for
more short time variation in the exchange rate. However, the increase in bonds and M1
following the fifth month after the initial exchange rate shock may be due to a central
bank purchase of domestic bonds. Consequently, it seems that the Belgian central bank
does not completely maintain restrictive policy measures, allowing for a higher variation
in the exchange rate than the other central banks.
53Furthermore, in Belgium M3 −M1 reacts positively (see figure A.2). This may indicate that com-
mercial banks substitute increasingly expensive central bank loans through acquiring additional savings
deposits.
54Through sterilised central bank interventions, the domestic bond interest rate would decrease. This
would cause a relative increase in the prices of domestic bonds compared to foreign bonds, thus bonds
would increase. However, in no analysed country does bonds increase following the initial exchange rate
shock. Consequently, sterilised central bank interventions do not seem to be regularly applied in practice.
55Still, it can be considered small if it is compared to the USD/DEM coefficient of variation which is
7.59% during the same time period.
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IV. Remarks on General Validity
Even though the model results become more reliable through the endogenisation of the
domestic asset supply, many simplifications remain. However, these simplifications are
not expected to be qualitatively essential, and may only quantitatively affect the model
results.
Assuming rational expectations (instead of static expectations), this would increase
the complexity of the model, reducing the extent, but not the direction of the short term
reactions of the endogenous variables (with respect to exogenous shocks). In addition,
the assumption of a constant velocity of money is unrealistic seeing as it has been com-
monly observed that changes in the money supply mainly affect the domestic price level
in the long term (Christiano et al., 1996; Serletis and Koustas, 1998; Bullard, 1999).
Consequently, one would expect that the velocity of money decreases after a monetary
expansion, subsequently increasing and reflecting its original range. As a result, increases
in the amount of dividend payments would only be effectively realised in the long term.
However, by assuming rational expectations, the relations would be qualitatively identi-
cal compared to the current model. Domestic private households would expect the future
increase in dividend cash flow today, and equity prices would increase instantly due to
the discounted cash flow approach. Consequently, the value of equity would exceed the
optimal portfolio composition and the demand for dividend payments would decrease in
the short term, as is the case within the current model.
Furthermore, it is implied that domestic private households consume all of their income.
They may save and invest either domestically or abroad, but domestic investments always
correspond to foreign disinvestments, and vice versa (see equation 44). In a nutshell, this
implies that aggregate savings are assumed to be zero for the sake of simplicity. However,
while to date it is still vague which variables generally determine the amount of savings
(Akerlof and Shiller, 2009), it would be expected that the decision of where savings are
invested is determined by the same procedures as the investment/disinvestment decision
within the current model. Taking savings into consideration, only the aggregate amount
of real investments would be affected, but not the decision of real investment allocation.
Therefore, no qualitative impact on the model results is expected if allowing savings to
be different from zero. Nevertheless, for future research it would certainly be valuable to
determine how changes in savings behaviour may affect interest rates and the exchange
rate within the current model.
Moreover, additional types of portfolio assets like savings deposits, real estate, or com-
modities are present in reality. Furthermore, the banking sector does not only consist of
the central bank, but also commercial banks. Domestic producers could be grouped in
to firms and the state, and they also use labour as a factor of production. In addition,
domestic private households generate income through wages, and finally, its assessment
of macroeconomic risk may be driven by psychological factors. Even though it could
certainly be enriching to estimate how central bank interventions may affect real estate
prices, the liquidity of commercial banks, the structure of state debt, relative factor prices,
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or investors’ level of confidence within the current model, one would not expect that the
introduction of such model extensions could distort, or radically change the present model
results.
However, the potential relation of risk clusters on central bank’s balance sheet with
respect to the domestic macroeconomic risk has yet to be researched. It is possible that
the central bank itself would become a source of macroeconomic risk if it builds up ex-
tensive risk clusters, with the impacts of additional interventions then being diminished
in such a situation. Furthermore, by extending the model with foreign actors or trans-
action costs, it is possible that expansive or exchange rate stabilising interventions do
not promote an inefficient allocation of real capital investments in certain situations. If,
for instance, changes in the relative attractiveness of domestic investments are due to
monetary interventions by the foreign central bank, expansive monetary interventions
by the domestic central bank may avert misallocation of real capital investments. In
addition, stabilisation of the exchange rate may have a positive impact on aggregate
welfare if real investment procedures are connected to transaction costs, and relative
macroeconomic risk (σ̂) follows a mean reverting process. In such a case, exchange rate
stabilising interventions would avert the transaction costs connected to real investment
procedures caused by stochastic changes in σ̂. This would be achieved by sustaining the
corresponding mean reverting level of real capital investments.
V. Conclusion
The presented model extends the existing portfolio balance framework by considering
an endogenous asset supply. Furthermore, it accounts for all balance restrictions con-
cerning the analysed economic actors and the balance of payments. Domestic private
households maximise real consumption with respect to the real exchange rate, as well
as optimise their portfolio composition following Markowitz’ portfolio selection. Besides
this, domestic producers optimise their capital structure following the static trade-off
theory and show arbitrage behaviour in the choice of debt capital. Within the model,
it becomes clear how asset prices, the exchange rate, and the international allocation
of real capital investments are affected by external variables and monetary policy inter-
ventions. Subsequently, the model results are applied by analysing expansive monetary
interventions and exchange rate stabilisation interventions in detail.
Expansive monetary interventions may avert real domestic disinvestments which are
caused by a relative increase in domestic macroeconomic risk. However, this can also give
rise to risk clusters on the central bank’s balance sheet, distortions of domestic interest
rates, increases in the domestic price level, and domestic currency devaluation. Even
though the impact of open market purchases of domestic bonds and the expansion of
credit lending are identical in the long term, bond purchases are expected to be more
effective in reducing negative impacts on private households’ wealth and at the zero lower
bound of interest rates.
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Concerning exchange rate stabilising interventions, it is essential to exert the ap-
propriate intervention strategy with respect to the underlying reason for the exchange
rate change. Sterilised interventions are required to neutralise exchange rate deviations
caused by changes in the relative macroeconomic risk and the foreign interest rate level.
Non-sterilised interventions are essential for averting exchange rate deviations caused by
changes in the foreign price level. However, sterilised interventions promote risk clusters
on the central bank’s balance sheet, whereas non-sterilised interventions are connected
with changes in the domestic price level. Furthermore, from the model we can see that
both types of interventions not only stabilise the exchange rate, but also the real amount
of domestic investments. Therefore, it becomes traceable why a collapse of a fixed ex-
change rate regime may be connected with real domestic adjustments. Furthermore,
implementing the wrong intervention strategy may avert exchange rate changes in the
short term, but in the long term, errors in strategy may be the reason why stabilising
interventions sometimes don’t succeed (Sarno and Taylor, 2001; Dominguez, 2006). In
the case of Austria, Belgium, and Denmark, the paper has empirically shown through
VAR impulse response estimations that non-sterilised interventions have predominantly
been carried out. This is plausible for these countries if exchange rate deviations can be
attributed to changes in relative good price expectations.
In addition to these results, it becomes visible that the stabilisation of the real amount
of domestic investments promotes an inefficient international allocation of real capital. If
external variables change, the relative advantage of real domestic investments is altered
with adjustments in the real amount of domestic and foreign investments therefore being
appropriate. Through expansive monetary interventions and exchange rate stabilisation,
the central bank stops the adequate adjustments in the international allocation of real
capital from occurring. However, more research is needed to analyse the impact of the
central bank’s asset structure on domestic macroeconomic risk. Furthermore, the central
bank’s impact on real capital allocation could even be positive in certain situations,
especially if the presence of foreign actors or transaction costs are taken into consideration.
In general, the actions of the central bank are connected with trade-offs from both
the domestic and the international perspective. Therefore, it is advisable to thoroughly
evaluate the welfare impact of central bank actions through a holistic and internationally
coordinated political process. This in turn allows for potentially diverse domestic and
foreign interests to be equally taken into account.
A supplemental paper referring in detail to the solving of the model and the test for stability, as well
as the respective EViews workfiles regarding the VAR estimations, are available for download at the
IQSS Dataverse http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/schueder.
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Appendix
Tables
Table A.1—Exogenous and Constant Variables
variable meaning
a total factor productivity (constant)
σ̂ relative macroeconomic risk (exogenous)
qB coupon payment on one domestic bond (constant)
qF coupon payment on one foreign asset in foreign currency (constant)
îF market interest rate on foreign assets (exogenous)
dc fraction of producers’ income spent on debt capital costs (constant)
K̂ credit amount (exogenous)
M initial amount of domestic money (constant)
n̂BCB amount of central bank’s domestic bonds (exogenous)
nF initial amount of foreign bonds held domestically (constant)
n̂FCB amount of central bank’s foreign bonds (exogenous)
p̂∗ price level of foreign goods in foreign currency (exogenous)
v velocity of money (constant)
Table A.2—Endogenous Variables
variable meaning
b fraction of private households’ portfolio held in domestic bonds
B total value of domestic bonds
BCB value of central bank’s domestic bonds
BP value of private households’ domestic bonds
BdP private households’ demand for domestic bond value
CD private households’ consumption of domestic goods
CF private households’ consumption of foreign goods
CG value of domestic capital goods
div dividend payment on one domestic equity asset
Div aggregate dividend payments
Divd demand for aggregate dividend payments
e fraction of private households’ portfolio held in domestic equity
E total value of domestic equity
Ed private households’ demand for domestic equity value
f fraction of private households’ portfolio held in foreign bonds
F value of foreign bonds held domestically in foreign currency
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variable meaning
FCB value of central bank’s foreign bonds in foreign currency
FP value of private households’ foreign bonds in foreign currency
F dP private households’ demand for foreign bond value in foreign currency
iB market interest rate on domestic bonds
iE market interest rate/required rate of return on domestic equity
iK credit interest rate
IncP private households’ income
Kd producers’ demand for credit
m fraction of private households’ portfolio held in money
M amount of money
Md money demand
Ms money supply
nB total amount of domestic bonds(nB)s total supply of domestic bond quantities
nBP amount of private households’ domestic bonds(nBP )d demand for domestic bond quantities(nBP )s supply of domestic bond quantities vis-a`-vis the private households
nCG real amount of domestic capital goods
nE total amount of domestic equity assets
nF total amount of foreign assets held domestically
nFP amount of private households’ foreign assets(nFP )d demand for foreign asset quantities(nFP )s supply of foreign bond quantities vis-a`-vis the private households
NetA central bank’s net assets
p price level of domestic goods
pB price of one domestic bond
pE price of one domestic equity asset
pF price of one foreign bond in foreign currency
s exchange rate in direct quotation
sreal real exchange rate
valCG implicit value of one capital good
W private households’ aggregate wealth
Y nominal domestic production
Y r real domestic production
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Table A.3—VAR Model Estimation Settings
Austria Belgium Denmark
time period start 1989M06 1989M10 1999M02
end 1998M12 1998M12 2011M03
lags 3 5 6
sample period start 1989M09 1990M03 1999M08
end 1998M12 1998M12 2011M03
incl. observations (after adj.) 112 106 140
edogenous variables 8 8 8
exogenous variables 14 14 12
constant 1 1 1
seasonal dummies 11 11 11
impulse dummy 1990M06 a 1 1 -
shift dummy 1990M06 a 1 1 -
total variables 38 54 60
degrees of freedom 74 52 80
a Dummies due to German monetary union.
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Table A.4—Test Statistics of VAR Model Estimations
Austria Belgium Denmark
VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests
(H0: no serial correlation at lag order h)
Lags Probability
1 0.342 0.146 0.781
2 0.223 0.428 0.352
3 0.623 0.285 0.688
4 0.598 0.891 0.567
5 0.473 0.310 0.009
6 0.463 0.132 0.029
7 0.826 0.805 0.115
8 0.508 0.207 0.657
9 0.858 0.434 0.975
10 0.379 0.624 0.400
11 0.672 0.760 0.293
12 0.335 0.282 0.650
13 0.594 0.963 0.959
14 0.729 0.784 0.590
15 0.589 0.354 0.576
16 0.337 0.452 0.900
17 0.900 0.682 0.232
18 0.858 0.591 0.652
VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Test
(H0: no heteroskedasticity)
Probability
Joint test 0.802 0.737 0.137
No Root outside the Unit Circle
(Stability Condition)
yes yes yes
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Figures
Figure A.1. : Exchange Rates
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Figure A.2. : Responses of M3 −M1 and inf
2 6 10 14 18
−1.2−0.8
−0.40
0.4
0.8
1.2
⋅10−2
Austria
M3 −M1
2 6 10 14 18
−4
−2
0
2
4
⋅10−3
inf
2 6 10 14 18
−1.6−0.8
0
0.8
1.6
2.4
⋅10−2
Belgium
M3 −M1
2 6 10 14 18
−0.8−0.4
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
⋅10−2
inf
2 6 10 14 18
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
⋅10−1
Denmark
M3 −M1
2 6 10 14 18
−2−1
0
1
2
3
⋅10−3
inf
Responses to a one standard deviation exchange rate shock (± 2 error stdv).
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